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Chapter 33

Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in an
Era of Drones and Deepfakes: Expanding
the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in
R v Jarvis
Kristen Thomasen and Suzie Dunn
Abstract
Perpetrators of Technology-Facilitated gender-based violence are taking
advantage of increasingly automated and sophisticated privacy-invasive
tools to carry out their abuse. Whether this be monitoring movements
through stalkerware, using drones to nonconsensually ﬁlm or harass, or
manipulating and distributing intimate images online such as deepfakes and
creepshots, invasions of privacy have become a signiﬁcant form of genderbased violence. Accordingly, our normative and legal concepts of privacy
must evolve to counter the harms arising from this misuse of new technology.
Canada’s Supreme Court recently addressed Technology-Facilitated violations of privacy in the context of voyeurism in R v Jarvis (2019). The discussion of privacy in this decision appears to be a good ﬁrst step toward a
more equitable conceptualization of privacy protection. Building on existing
privacy theories, this chapter examines what the reasoning in Jarvis might
mean for “reasonable expectations of privacy” in other areas of law, and
how this concept might be interpreted in response to gender-based
Technology-Facilitated violence. The authors argue the courts in Canada
and elsewhere must take the analysis in Jarvis further to fully realize a notion
of privacy that protects the autonomy, dignity, and liberty of all.
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Introduction
Advances in technology over the past several decades have changed our understandings of what is considered “private” in relation to both location and information (Bailey, 2009; Scassa, 2010). Technologies such as drones, stalkerware,
and hidden cameras have impacted our expectations of privacy. Traditional
approaches to privacy law that drew a bright line between private and public
spaces – a conceptual division that has not historically beneﬁtted women (Allen,
1988) and has been rejected by many privacy scholars (Nissenbaum, 2010) – are
further broken down by what we describe in the ﬁrst section of this chapter as
“technologies of exposure and control.” These technologies provide third-party
access to once private realms and allow for the unwarranted gathering and
sharing of private information in ways never seen before (Dodge, 2016; Khoo,
Robertson, & Deibert, 2019). As privacy norms shift to incorporate these new
technologies, it is important to acknowledge the ways in which privacy norms
have and continue to neglect the interests of women and other marginalized
groups (Bailey, 2014). As noted by Anita Allen (1988), women have had too much
of the wrong type of privacy (requiring them to be modest in public or risk
inviting privacy invasions, such as sexual harassment), and not enough of the
right type of privacy (some privacy norms failed to protect women from genderbased violence in the private sphere, such as intimate partner violence, which was
considered a private affair not deserving of state or outside intervention).
Gendered privacy norms meant that experiences of domestic violence, workplace
and street harassment, voyeurism, and stalking of women long went un- or underprotected in law (Balos, 2004).
Gendered privacy invasions have evolved in the digital era. Unfortunately,
perpetrators of Technology-Facilitated gender-based violence are taking advantage of privacy-invasive tools that are increasingly sophisticated and user-friendly
to carry out their abuse (Bailey & Mathen, 2019; Powell & Henry, 2017). Today,
we grapple with issues of whether it is appropriate to take sexualized photos of
women in public without their knowledge, dox1 them without consent using facial
recognition technology (FRT), replicate their images through technology in sexist
ways, or trace their activities using tracking software or drones. Accordingly, our
normative and legal concepts of privacy must evolve to counter the gender-based
harms arising from this misuse of new technology. This evolution must include
the court’s assessment of when a person can reasonably expect privacy against the
use of these emerging technologies.
Oftentimes in the Canadian legal system, legal protection of privacy interests
and remedies for invasions of privacy are framed around the concept of a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” (REP). This concept of REP can serve as a
legal threshold that a person claiming protection must establish. Generally, to
assess a claimant’s REP, courts will consider the context of an alleged privacy
invasion to determine whether an imagined “reasonable person” would have
expected privacy in those circumstances. This may include considering factors
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such as the location of the invasion, what was accessed, why it was accessed, how
it was accessed, who accessed it, and/or the privacy interests in whatever was
accessed. The most substantial REP jurisprudence in Canada emerges from
Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), which prohibits sanctionless state searches that interfere with one’s REP, such as warrantless police
searches (McGill & Kerr, 2012). However, REP is also signiﬁcant when assessing
whether other laws prohibit gender-based privacy intrusions, or where a survivor
of such intrusions can seek compensation or another remedy (Aikenhead, 2018).
For instance, Canada’s voyeurism and nonconsensual distribution of intimate
image offenses (Criminal Code, 1985, ss. 162 & 162.1) require an analysis of a
claimant’s REP in order to convict. Analysis of a plaintiff’s expectation of privacy
also arises in civil claims for invasion of privacy, and for the nonconsensual
distribution of intimate images (e.g., Jane Doe 72511 v Morgan, 2018; Intimate
Images Protection Act, 2018). Further, REP guides an analysis of whether police
interview records, therapy records, or other intimate records related to a sexual
assault complainant must be provided to an accused in a sexual assault criminal
trial, engaging the complainant’s privacy interests as well as the retraumatizing
experience of a sexual assault trial (R v Mills, 1999; see also Gotell, 2006). In all of
these cases, the REP concept is the conceptual hurdle to the legal system’s
denunciation of gendered privacy invasions.
When the courts address these privacy issues, we argue that they must consider
equality as a guiding factor in the REP analysis in order to recognize and refute
sexist and other discriminatory privacy norms that could otherwise be replicated
alongside these new technologies (Aikenhead, 2018; Bailey, 2008). Canada’s
Supreme Court recently addressed Technology-Facilitated violations of privacy in
the context of criminal voyeurism in R v Jarvis (2019). In this decision, the court
listed several factors that could be relevant in a REP analysis under the voyeurism
offense; however, it did not note equality as a speciﬁc factor. This was despite the
case’s relevant equality issues related to the gender and age of the complainant,
and the arguement by two intervenors that equality should be a relevant factor in
the REP analysis. This decision appears to be a good ﬁrst step toward a more
equitable conceptualization of privacy protection (Bailey, 2020). However, we
argue that neglecting to explicitly acknowledge equality as a distinct factor in the
REP analysis was a missed opportunity. Including equality in the REP analysis is
a necessary next step in the advancement of REP jurisprudence.
To provide a technological context to our privacy discussion, the ﬁrst section
of this chapter introduces examples of privacy-invasive technologies of exposure
and control, highlighting the ways in which technology can be used for genderbased abuse. The chapter then moves on to a summary of R v Jarvis examining
the REP framework it established. The subsequent section builds on previous
privacy scholarship to discuss why and how equality could be considered when
assessing expectations of privacy, particularly in response to the ways in which
technologies of exposure and control are used to speciﬁcally invade the privacy of
women and other equality-seeking groups. The chapter concludes with a summary of how the contextual approach to privacy in Jarvis (2019) must extend even
further to address new Technology-Facilitated ways of exposing and controlling
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one another that have signiﬁcant equality impacts for privacy-marginalized
groups, including women.
While the Jarvis (2019) decision arises out of a criminal law proceeding, we
recognize that the criminal justice system is not necessarily a substantially effective or appropriate mechanism for addressing sexual and gender-based violence,
like voyeurism, from the perspective of survivors, offenders, or society as a whole.
Nevertheless, what the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has to say about privacy
in general, and the nonconsensual collection and use of intimate images specifically, sets social norms. It is therefore important to examine these aspects of the
decision, while simultaneously considering how we as a society can better respond
to sexual violence (Thomasen & Dunn, 2019).

The Technological Landscape
Digital technologies are becoming increasingly sophisticated, compact, affordable, and user-friendly, changing the landscape of accessible tools that can be used
to invade another person’s privacy (Citron, 2019; Khoo et al., 2019). While these
new tools often have beneﬁcial social uses, they can also be used in privacyinvasive ways that target equality-seeking groups. In fact, some are speciﬁcally
designed and marketed with the intention to invade people’s privacy, including
targeting women. Stalkerware has been advertised as a “girlfriend tracking”
application (Parsons et al., 2019, p. 69), and facial recognition tools have been
promoted to help people match strangers they ﬁnd attractive in public places with
their social media accounts, regardless of whether that person is interested in
being identiﬁed (Royakkers, Timmer, & KoolRinie van Est, 2018; Walker, 2016).
In this section, we deﬁne and look at examples of two groups of technology that
we have termed “technologies of exposure” and “technologies of control” to
explore the ways that technology shifts the ability of people to invade other
people’s privacy, thus impacting societal expectations of privacy. These groupings
are not meant to be mutually exclusive, but rather allow us to focus on the new
privacy-invasive capabilities that these technologies bring with them. We will
highlight some of the ways these technologies are used to expose and/or control
women and other equality-seeking groups.

Technologies of Exposure
Technologies of exposure are technologies that can be used to identify, share,
publish, create, or decontextualize information about another person that they
might not want discovered or used in a particular context.2 This section reviews
several current examples of technologies of exposure that have facilitated gendered
privacy intrusions, including the use of FRT to identify women without their
consent (Brinckerhoff, 2018); social network platforms used to dox women
(Rothrock, 2016); deepfake videos (Chesney & Citron, 2019); and creepshots
(Laidlaw, 2017). The examples cited in this section help demonstrate how these
technologies are speciﬁcally, though certainly not exclusively, targeted against
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women. Abusers of this technology expose women’s information to intentionally
draw unwanted attention to them, sometimes encouraging groups of people to
collectively harass the exposed individual (Citron, 2014). They typically draw
attention to women in ways that sexualize their everyday activities, shame them for
engaging in sexual activity, or threaten them for transgressing patriarchal gender
norms (Hargreaves, 2014; Henry & Flynn, 2019; McGlynn, Rackley, & Houghton,
2017). Decontextualized information further reinforces sexist ideas about women,
such as publishing collections of images on “revenge porn” or creepshot sites that
suggest women deserve to be sexually objectiﬁed and criticized, and that men are
entitled to view and sexualize images of their bodies without their consent (Dunn &
Petricone-Westwood, 2018; Henry & Flynn, 2019). This can cause women to
disengage from digital spaces, puts them at risk of harassment and violence, and
creates additional burdens for women who feel the need to modify their selfexpression to avoid being exposed (Powell & Henry, 2017), as is discussed at
further length in the next subsection on technologies of control.

Facial Recognition and Doxing
FRT uses biometric data to map a person’s facial structure to identify the individual by matching data points from their image to previous images of them
(Introna & Nissenbaum, 2011). Many facial recognition systems have been
notoriously unreliable, particularly with respect to accurately identifying people
of color, and women of color more speciﬁcally, as the data sets used in these
programs have not included a wide diversity of images of these groups of people
to learn from (Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018; Grother, Ngan, & Hanaoka, 2019).
Nevertheless, some designers boast statistically signiﬁcant accuracy rates in
identifying the targeted person (Lippman, Cassimatis, & Renn, 2019). Disturbingly, this technology has been used to identify and dox women who appear in
sexual content online. Both individual hobbyists and organized groups have used
FRT for this purpose. For example, many sex workers choose not to associate
their real names or contact information with their online sexual content for privacy or safety reasons (Nelson, 2019). In 2016, there were media reports that a
group in Russia used a facial recognition app, FindFace, to create a database that
matched images of female escorts and pornography actors with their social media
proﬁles (Rothrock, 2016). Once matched with their social media information, the
group shared the women’s sexual content with their family and social media
contacts, and publicly posted their identifying information and contact information, encouraging others to harass the women (Rothrock, 2016). In May 2019,
a computer programmer, Li Xu, published a post on Weibo claiming he had used
FRT to identify over 100,000 women from adult pornography videos by crossreferencing their images with images he had scraped from social media sites. The
stated purpose of his program was to allow men to ﬁnd out if their girlfriends had
ever been featured in sexual content online (Dickson, 2019). Neither Xu nor the
FindFace group used this technology to expose the men featured in the sexual
content.
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Sex workers are not alone in being targeted for appearing in sexual content
online by technologies of exposure. Some users of websites hosting so-called
“revenge pornography,” child pornography, or sexual exploitation content
identify and reveal the names and contact information of the people in these
images (Powell & Henry, 2017; Powell, Henry, & Flynn, 2018). Young women
who were coerced into being featured in the popular GirlsDoPorn videos were
often doxed in the comments section of the videos once they were published on
PornHub without their consent. The women featured in these ﬁlms were typically
promised that the videos would not be posted on the internet. Once viewers
identiﬁed the cities and towns the women lived in, they would share the sexual
content with members of that community and harass the women featured in the
ﬁlms (Cole, 2019). This causes fear in the women who were doxed and encourages
mob harassment (Citron, 2014), which is closely connected to issues of control
discussed below, in particular, the intended and practical silencing of women’s
contributions online.
Deepfakes
The term “deepfake” refers to the use of “deep learning,” or machine learning
techniques, to create “fake” images or videos of people. This is done using an
artiﬁcial intelligence technique that maps out the details of a person’s face in order
to superimpose that person’s face onto the face of another person in a video
(Chesney & Citron, 2019). Deepfakes have gained recent attention out of concerns
that malicious actors could use this technique to create disruptive fake political
videos (Caldera, 2019). However, a recent report by Deeptrace Labs found that
96% of all deepfake videos were pornographic and nonconsensual videos made of
women (Ajder, Patrini, Cavalli, & Cullen, 2019). While this technique can also be
used in ways unrelated to gender and gender-based abuse, creating an opportunity
for new forms of reputational and dignitary abuse (as a woman’s face can be
superimposed on any number of base videos, not just sexual ones), these videos
most often bring unwanted sexual attention to the targeted women and can
negatively impact their sexual autonomy by presenting them in sexual scenarios in
which they did not participate (Flynn, 2019; Henry et al., 2020).
Discrete Camera Technology
Discrete and high-resolution cameras constitute a technologies of exposure when
used for gender-based privacy invasions colloquially called “creepshots” (Burns,
2018). Creepshots are photos taken using cameras, sometimes hidden in everyday
objects such as pens or shoes. These cameras are concealed so that they can be used
to take pictures of women’s bodies without their consent or awareness while they
are out in public. The women in the images are typically clothed, but the images
are focused on their bodies in a sexualized manner and can be posted online along
with other sexual commentary (Tran, 2015). Some photos are taken up a woman’s
skirt or down her blouse, known as “upskirting” or “down-blousing” (Flynn &
Henry, 2019; McGlynn, Rakley, & Houghton, 2017). It is not just the camera
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technology that allows for creepshots, but the ability to share the images with a
larger audience online. The images on creepshot websites, forums, and hashtags
are almost exclusively focused on women (Thompson & Wood, 2018). In Canada,
a man hosted a “CanadaCreeps” Twitter page where he had over 17,000 followers
and posted images of women and girls to the account who were photographed
without their knowledge while walking in public (Laidlaw, 2017). Research has
shown that the allure of creepshots includes taking the image of a woman without
her noticing, and then consuming it without her consent (Burns, 2018; Oliver,
2016). This is made easier through technological improvements that increase the
resolution and decrease the size of cameras, making them more discreet and
operable at greater distances, fueling this form of privacy intrusion. These exposure
concerns also arise in relation to drone technology, discussed below as a technology of control.

Technologies of Control
Technologies of control are those that can be used to monitor, track, or observe
the conduct and activities of a person in ways intended to either cause that person
to self-regulate their behavior or permit someone else to control or affect their
behavior, such that they do not feel free to do as they please. Studies have shown
that surveillance technologies can cause a person to alter or self-censor their
behaviors if they believe they are being watched (Manokha, 2018). Much has been
written about the panoptic effect of technology – where the feeling of being
observed (sometimes even without actually being observed) limits one’s sense of
freedom to act, move, or speak as they would otherwise (e.g., Koskela, 2000;
Koskela, 2002a). Surveillance technologies that monitor, track, follow, and report
back to another contribute to different forms of self-regulation or avoidance of
different spaces and the sense of an external exertion of control over how the
targeted individual conducts their daily life. These technologies can also build on
the disempowering effects of unwanted exposure by subjecting individuals on an
ongoing basis to monitoring and potential subsequent exposure, or the sense
thereof. Surveillance technologies like drones and spyware/stalkerware make
monitoring – or even just the perception of it – easier to carry out, and in some
cases these technologies permit fully automated monitoring. Similar to the targeting by technologies of exposure noted in the previous section, technologies of
control are often speciﬁcally targeted toward women and other equality-seeking
groups (Bailey, 2020; Gilliard, 2020; Waldman, 2019; see also Anderson, 2015).
The following subsections discuss two examples of emerging technologies of
control that will challenge the way privacy expectations are currently understood
by Canadian precedents: drones and stalkerware.
Public Space Drone Surveillance
Countless examples of the use of drone technology to spy on and harass women in
public spaces have made media headlines in recent years, to the point of becoming
a notable (and overly simplistic) media trope (Kaminski, 2013; Thomasen, 2018).
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Drone technology is becoming increasingly accessible on the consumer market in
terms of availability and cost. Because a drone operates remotely from its pilot –
with ranges commonly up to several hundred meters – the technology can overcome not only physical barriers like fences and walls but also normative barriers,
like expectations that a person will not take photographs in a particular location,
or stare at someone for too long. Drone technology has been used to ﬁlm or
photograph women on their balconies, in backyards, on public beaches, and at
public pools. Instances of drones being used to stalk, intimidate, and harass
women have been cited in different countries (see examples in Thomasen, 2018).
These encounters can affect how targeted individuals are able to freely access, use,
and enjoy public and publicly visible spaces, risking inequitable exclusion from or
enjoyment of these spaces.
The features of drone technology – including its remote operation, aerial
overhead nature, and increasing commercial availability – give it the potential to
exacerbate existing privacy-invasive experiences of unwanted monitoring and
photography, street harassment, and intimidation, in terms of both the frequency
and the quality of the experience (Davis, 1994; Koskela, 2000, 2002b; Thompson,
1993; Vera-Gray, 2016). Footage collected by a drone can take on a further
invasive quality when posted and shared online, leading to exposure concerns
such as those discussed in the sections above.
Spyware/Stalkerware
Commercially available applications of spyware can be installed on mobile
devices and used to illicitly track the location of, and gather information from, a
device and share it with another person (Parsons et al., 2019). Spyware can be
used for a range of malicious surveillance activities, but numerous investigations
have revealed a gendered dimension to the use of spyware. Citizen Lab recently
released two reports on stalkerware (spyware used for the purpose of surveillance
in contexts of intimate partner violence). The reports, among other things,
emphasize the frequent use of different spyware apps in the context of intimate
partner violence, often targeted at spying on women speciﬁcally (Parsons et al.,
2019), and assess legal and policy responses to this technology (Khoo et al., 2019).
The reports emphasize the ways in which this technology can be used (and in
some cases, is speciﬁcally designed) to exert control and power over another
individual. As the authors explain:
Spyware has a wide range of capabilities, including pervasive
monitoring of text and chat messages, recording phone logs,
tracking social media posts, logging website visits, activating a GPS
system, registering keystrokes, and even activating phones’
microphones and cameras, as well as sometimes blocking incoming
phone calls. These capabilities can afford dramatic powers and
control over an individual’s everyday life. And when this software is
used abusively, it can operate as a predator in a person’s pocket,
magnifying the pervasive surveillance of the spyware operator.
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Intimate partner violence, abuse, and harassment is routinely linked
with efforts to monitor and control a targeted person. As new
technologies have seeped into everyday life, aggressors have
adopted and repurposed them to terrorize, control, and manipulate
their current and former partners. (Parsons et al., 2019, p. 25)
This technology, like the ones discussed above, is not the reason that control
and monitoring occurs in intimate partner relationships and elsewhere, but it
alters the ease and secrecy of collection, and the quantity and quality of monitoring in ways that are poorly restricted by the current legal system. These new
technologies also do not create or cause gendered violence, but emerging technologies do make such exposure and control easier to carry out, expanding and
potentially deepening the range of privacy intrusions experienced by women and
other equality-seeking groups.
Each of the above technologies generates new sociolegal challenges and
exacerbates gendered and systemic privacy challenges, to which legal and other
institutions must adjust and respond. We argue that one crucial component of this
response will be for courts to recognize the ways in which privacy invasions can
reﬂect inequality, and to incorporate an analysis of this reality into the legal
protections of privacy. In particular, into the concept of REP which serves as a
threshold for obtaining legal recourse.

Technology and Equality-conscious Assessments of
Privacy Expectations
The above section demonstrates how emerging technologies have been used to, or
in some cases are explicitly designed to, permit gender-based invasions of privacy.
These technologies exacerbate systemic privacy challenges by increasing the
quantity and changing the quality of intrusions and by taking advantage of
weaknesses in legal protection. The selective targeting of women in these examples is central to understanding how equality and privacy issues intersect. In other
words, some groups are more targeted for privacy invasions and less protected by
law because legal protections were not historically developed to respond to their
privacy experiences. Accordingly, new theoretical approaches are needed to better
address this disparity. We need approaches that take equality into account,
particularly when considering the legal understanding of a REP. Several privacy
laws that require a REP analysis, including those prohibiting voyeurism and
nonconsensual distribution of intimate images, were enacted in Canada specifically in response to privacy violations that typically target vulnerable groups,
including women and children (Bailey, 2020; Department of Justice, 2002;
Department of Justice, 2013), yet do not explicitly address equality. The introduction of these laws helps protect against gender-based privacy invasions
(Bailey, 2016; Dunn & Petricone-Westwood, 2018). However, we argue that
although the courts are moving toward a contextual approach that could support
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an equality analysis (Bailey, 2020), the gendered and equality impacts of these
invasions are not sufﬁciently addressed in the courts’ privacy analysis as it stands.
The SCC recently considered the privacy-invasive nature of technologyfacilitated voyeurism in R v Jarvis (2019). The next subsection outlines the
SCC’s decision. While the decision had many positive features, it neglected to
explicitly consider equality as a factor in the privacy analysis. The following
subsection discusses why this is a problem and outlines some theoretical
approaches that could help decision-makers integrate equality into the REP
analysis in the future.

R v Jarvis: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Analysis
The criminal voyeurism appeal in R v Jarvis (2019) asked the SCC to consider
whether young women had a REP in the semipublic place of their high school.
Ryan Jarvis, a teacher, had been using a camera hidden in a pen to secretly take
photos of his female students while they were on school property, for his personal
sexual use. Dozens of videos found on the device focused predominantly on his
female students’ breasts and upper bodies.3 One of his female colleagues was also
the focus of his recordings.
Jarvis was charged with voyeurism under a Criminal Code provision that
hinges on whether the complainants had a REP in the circumstances in which
they were recorded. At the trial level, Jarvis was acquitted, as the court did not
conclusively ﬁnd the images were taken for a sexual purpose. The Ontario Court
of Appeal upheld the acquittal, however, this time on the basis that the young
women did not have a REP. This assessment was based on the fact that the girls
were in a semipublic space in their school at the time of the recording; that there
were CCTV security cameras in the school and students were aware they were
being ﬁlmed by those cameras; and the girls’ bodies were available for public gaze
because they were not completely concealed by conservative clothing. That
decision was overturned by the SCC, which recognized the privacy expectations of
the women ﬁlmed by Jarvis.
The majority of the SCC recognized that privacy expectations are not solely
predicated on whether the girls were in a public or a private space, ﬁnding instead
that the determination must be based on a variety of contextual factors. The
relative privacy of the space was only one factor to consider among many. Chief
Justice Wagner, for the majority, noted a nonexhaustive list of nine factors
relevant to assessing the complainants’, and any future complainant’s, REP under
the voyeurism offense, including:

•
•
•
•
•

The location the person was in when she4 was observed or recorded;
The nature of the impugned conduct, that is, whether it consisted of observation
or recording;
Awareness of or consent to potential observation or recording;
The manner in which the observation or recording was done;
The subject matter or content of the observation or recording;
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Any rules, regulations, or policies that governed the observation or recording
in question;
The relationship between the person who was observed or recorded and the
person who did the observing or recording;
The purpose for which the observation or recording was done; and
The personal attributes of the person who was observed or recorded (R v
Jarvis, 2019).

Applying these factors, the majority of the Court found that the complainants
in this case did have a REP against being secretly recorded by their teacher for a
sexual purpose, even though they were in a semipublic place. In particular, the
majority emphasized that Jarvis’s use of technology to collect sustained, focused,
and long-lasting images engaged the students’ reasonable expectations of privacy
in the semipublic spaces of their high school.
At the SCC hearing, two interveners argued that equality should be a factor in
the REP analysis given the gendered dynamic at issue in this case and in
voyeurism more generally, putting the Court on notice that equality could be a
relevant issue to address in the REP analysis (CIPPIC, 2019; LEAF, 2019). In the
end, the Court did not list equality as a factor to consider, nor did it speciﬁcally
address the gendered nature of the privacy invasion at issue in this case. As
previously noted by Moira Aikenhead (2018) and Jane Bailey (2020), while this
decision moves the REP analysis closer to an equality-focused approach to
privacy, it was a missed opportunity to include equality in the analysis, leaving a
critical gap in Canadian privacy jurisprudence.

Equality
As demonstrated in the previous sections, the development and use of privacyinvasive technologies are not neutral. Technology, like the camera pen used by
Jarvis or drones used to photograph women, have disparate impacts on equalityseeking groups who are uniquely targeted (Thomasen, 2018). Not only are women
the primary targets of creepshots (Burns, 2018) and deepfakes, technology like
stalkerware has been overtly marketed to surreptitiously invade women’s privacy
and monitor their private moments, communications, and life choices (Parsons
et al., 2019). Women with intersecting marginalities are further targeted by
invasive technologies. LGBTQI people have had their sexual orientation or birth
sex “outed” and exposed to homophobic social groups in ways that put them at
risk (Ashley, 2018; Waldman, 2019). Racialized women activists have been
stalked and tracked online due to their race and gender, including by governments
and law enforcement (Amnesty International, 2018; Ofﬁce of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, 2013). When private or identifying information is
published online, it has been paired with derogatory sexist, racist, and homophobic commentary and images (Jane, 2014). These privacy invasions are speciﬁcally tied to equality factors such as gender, sexuality, and race. This
discriminatory targeting and marketing, combined with the challenges that targets
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face in having protective laws applied or enforced, results in inequality that must
be addressed by the legal system (Citron, 2019; Dunn, Lalonde, & Bailey, 2017;
Khoo et al., 2019). Without directly recognizing this inequality, the legal system
risks neglecting discriminatory norms that impact equality-seeking groups’
autonomy and signaling that important equality factors in privacy are not worth
directly addressing.
Inequality in privacy is nothing new, modern technologies only reemphasize
the need to acknowledge equality when considering REP. Privacy norms, and the
laws that protect them, illuminate the ways in which dominant groups have
controlled who beneﬁts from privacy protection – or the lack thereof. Whether it
be legally permissive male access to women’s bodies (Koshan, 2017), institutionally sanctioned homophobic invasion of LBGTQI spaces (Bérubé, 2003), or
colonial surveillance of Indigenous, Black, and racialized people (Browne, 2015;
Choudry, 2019; Crosby & Monaghan, 2018; Magnet, 2011; Tulloch, 2018),
examining whose privacy is protected and whose is permissibly breached, both
historically and currently, exposes the lived impacts of privacy norms on equalityseeking groups.
In order to properly address systemic and substantive equality issues related to
privacy, legal decision-makers must explicitly inform privacy law-making and
enforcement with equality in mind. Without considering equality, the law only
grants permeable protection to those vulnerable to intrusions due to their social
location. On the surface, it would seem that the SCC considered some factors that
could be afﬁliated with equality in their REP analysis in Jarvis (2019). Factors
such as the personal attributes of the individual targeted or her relationship to the
perpetrator could be used to address some of the power imbalances that are
rooted in inequality. In fact, the Court recognized the girls’ youth as a factor that
contributed to their REP. However, the Court was surprisingly quiet on how their
gender inﬂuenced their REP, despite the highly gendered nature of this crime. As
noted by Jane Bailey (2020), neglecting equality leaves the burden on future
victims to weave an equality argument into the REP analysis within the current
factors. If equality had been explicitly recognized as a factor relevant to REP, we
believe the Court would need to actively examine whether the claimants were
members of an equality-seeking group and how that may impact their experience
of privacy and their REP. This recognition and analysis from the Court would go
a long way in countering discriminatory privacy norms.
Integrating Equality into the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Analysis
The SCC’s decision in Jarvis (2019) was a clear step forward in addressing many
concerns regarding the advancement of technology and its impact on privacy
norms (Thomasen & Dunn, 2019). The Court acknowledged how a recording
device allows for a level of scrutiny and permanence that is fundamentally
different than human observation and permits repetitive viewing. The recording
device also allows for the potential redistribution of the images in question.
Beyond the important recognition that technology changes the REP analysis, the
Court also recognized the role that the relationship between the person using
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technology to invade privacy and the person targeted plays in the REP analysis,
as well as the personal attributes of the person targeted (R v Jarvis, 2019). These
factors can be used to understand some of the issues of power and vulnerability
that affect privacy invasions. The Court in Jarvis (2019) noted the power
imbalance between the teacher and his students and the vulnerability of the young
people ﬁlmed. However, while these factors may provide space for courts to
recognize the effect of inequalities between the speciﬁc parties in a particular case,
the factors as they stand now do not go far enough to ensure systemic inequalities
will be addressed in the REP analysis. This was a signiﬁcant gap in the REP
framework set out by the SCC.
In this section, we examine some of the ways the court could have incorporated
equality into the decision in Jarvis (2019). Drawing on several privacy theories, we
highlight a selection of equality issues that were central to this case and argue that
including these considerations would have led to a more fulsome decision that
could better address substantive equality in this case and future cases. We suggest
that acknowledging equality in the REP analysis by actively examining the
intersecting social locations of the individual(s) targeted, the challenges women
and other equality-seeking groups face in remaining obscure, and the ways that
inequality affects the capacity to trust would encourage an analysis that more
adequately addresses privacy in the technological age.
First, by incorporating equality into the analysis, courts would be expected to
recognize the ways in which an individual’s social location will inﬂuence their
experiences of privacy. The Court in Jarvis (2019) included the personal attributes
of the claimants in the list of factors to consider in the voyeurism REP analysis,
something that could allow equality factors like age and gender to be addressed.
This “personal attributes” factor creates space for an equality-based argument
from claimants, but it does not go far enough. It does not require courts to
address equality considerations directly and explicitly. Ideally, courts would take
an intersectional approach to acknowledge the ways in which gender and other
sites of oppression can change the quality and quantity of privacy intrusions, and
accordingly strengthen one’s REP.
For instance, in applying this factor in Jarvis (2019), the Court noted the
young age of the claimants and the particular vulnerability of young people.
However, the claimants were not speciﬁcally targeted or made vulnerable solely
because they were young people. No young boys were the focus of Jarvis’s ﬁlms.
Furthermore, it is often overlooked that Jarvis not only ﬁlmed his young female
students but also ﬁlmed an adult female colleague, suggesting youth alone was not
the reason for his focus. The social location in terms of both the age and gender of
the complainants was relevant in this case, as was pointed out by two interveners.
Yet gender was not noted as a relevant personal attribute of the claimants by the
Court, even though all shared the same gender. Had the Court been expected to
look to equality factors, we argue that both age and gender would likely have
been addressed, and importantly, the analysis of Jarvis’s conduct would have
more fully reﬂected the claimants’ lived experiences and expectations of privacy –
enhancing their REP against this use of technology that deepens (and creates a
permanent record of) existing social vulnerabilities.5
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For the courts to ensure equal protection of privacy interests, judges must
resist any formalist application of the law and recognize that because different
groups of people have different lived experiences of privacy, protection needs
to respond to, rather than overlook, those differences. Anita Allen (1988,
2010) has found that women, people of color, and LGBTQI people have not
historically beneﬁted from privacy norms and laws in the same ways as cisgender white men (see also Allen & Mack, 1991). Certain groups face repetitive and sometimes daily privacy invasions as part of their reality. As women
and girls experience more regular invasions of privacy, there is a cumulative
effect in addition to the speciﬁc effect of each invasion. Street harassment,
digital stalking, doxing, and the decontextualization of their sexuality can
cause women to avoid certain behaviors or spaces in anticipation of privacy
invasions (Henry et al., 2020). This denies women the respite, anonymity, and
self-exploration that others might enjoy in physical and digital public spaces
(Allen, 2000; Citron, 2019).
Inequitable privacy norms can be seen in the ways in which others, particularly
those in dominant groups, might feel entitled to invade a woman’s privacy by
inquiring about or touching her body, questioning the legitimacy of her gender or
sexual expression, commenting on her in digital spaces, or tracking her movements through public space, depending on her intersecting social locations.
A pregnant Indigenous ciswoman (Ridgen, 2020) may experience privacy-related
interactions differently than a transgender lesbian (Ashley, 2018), or a woman
experiencing a long-term disability (Milner v Manufacturers Life Insurance
Company, 2005), though all should be entitled to equal legal protection for their
REP, even if what is necessary and reasonable differs based on circumstances and
identity factors.6
The speciﬁcity and regularity of privacy invasions can cause many women and
girls to have a heightened awareness that their privacy may be unfairly invaded.
Overlooking that reality obscures an essential part of the harm women experience,
including the reasons why they may have a different sense of what is “reasonable”
in regards to their privacy and the role the courts should play in correcting these
societal harms.
In the case of Jarvis (2019), the young girls Jarvis ﬁlmed faced higher risks of
having their images taken and sexualized in general due to the societal hypersexualization and fetishization of young women’s and teen girls’ bodies, as we
have seen is the case in voyeuristic creepshots (Burns, 2018). If the REP analysis is
meant to be based in the circumstances of the case, the scope of these circumstances must expand to address systemic realities. Courts must recognize how
inequality contributes to the normalization of certain types of intrusion and
condemn discriminatory privacy norms as “unreasonable” in their REP analysis.
This should be the case regardless of who is carrying out the intrusion – be it the
state, a company, or a private individual.
Second, building on the recognition of differing privacy experiences between
equality-seeking groups, courts also need to recognize the ways in which
circumstantially dominant groups (i.e., the members of this group might change
depending on the circumstances) can rely on normative privacy protections that
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are not always available to minority groups, and ﬁll in those gaps with law.
Woodrow Hartzog (2018) has deﬁned the concept of “obscurity” as
…the notion that when our activities or information are unlikely to
be found, seen or remembered, it is, to some degree, safe. People
calculate risk every day based on how obscure they are or are
likely to be. (p. 108)
Women’s, girls’, and many transgender people’s bodies do not remain obscure
in the same way cis-men’s and boys’ do, and as such they are not able to take the
same kinds of risks in regards to their sexual and gender expression (Ashley, 2018;
Dodge, 2016). For example, women are much more likely to be policed for their
sexual conduct on digital platforms (Powell & Henry, 2017), targeted by sexual
deepfakes (Chesney & Citron, 2019), doxed if they are sex workers (Rothrock,
2016), and experience violence due to the outing of their transfeminine gender
identity (Ashley, 2018).
A person’s social location can draw unwanted attention toward them, as was
the case for the girls and woman in Jarvis (2019). Due to their gender, they could
not beneﬁt from obscurity in the ways that the men and boys in the school were
able to. Incidents like these can inﬂuence how girls and women in the future
perceive privacy in their schools and workplaces, diminishing the beneﬁts they
have in these spaces as their expectations of these types of privacy invasions are
heightened (even though they should not reasonably have to expect such targeting). In addition, where technology makes intrusive conduct easier or allows
conduct to become more deeply intrusive, it undermines one’s expectations that
physical and normative barriers will protect against different types of invasions
(Hartzog, 2018). This can be seen in the increasing ease of surveillance and
control of women that accompanies increasingly automated and remote technologies like drones and spyware apps that provide access to once private spaces
and information (Khoo et al., 2019; Thomasen, 2018). Technologies like Jarvis’s
camera pen overcome the practical barriers that would otherwise prevent his longterm visual access to the complainants’ bodies.
The SCC introduced the idea of privacy by obscurity into its Jarvis (2019)
factors by emphasizing the differences between human observation and a
recording. Obscurity that might exist in human forgetfulness or the ﬂeeting
nature of an interaction is lost when the interaction is recorded and becomes
storable and sharable. Yet, if equality had been recognized, the Court could
have taken notice of who is more likely to be captured by these technologies by
voyeurs, not just how these technologies change the observation. Canadian
case law clearly demonstrates that women and girls are less likely to beneﬁt
from obscurity when it comes to voyeuristic recordings as they are the primary
targets of voyeurs (Bailey, 2020). Women and girls walking in public for
everyday reasons or engaging in normal activities in private spaces are more
likely to have their photos surreptitiously taken by people who want to collect
and share photos of women they ﬁnd sexually attractive (Burns, 2018). As
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such, a woman’s ability to remain obscure is limited in a way that the obscurity
of a man in the same situation is not. Of course, men’s obscurity might be
affected by their social locations in other ways, as is the case of men on gay
dating apps (Waldman, 2019), or Black men targeted for greater police scrutiny in public spaces (OHRC, 2018), a reality that similarly must be accounted
for in the REP analysis. This ampliﬁed scrutiny can be better accounted for
in the REP analysis through, among other things, a recognition of the ways in
which certain people gain privacy protection through obscurity that those
in equality-seeking groups may not. Members of equality-seeking groups
should nevertheless be entitled to reasonably expect the same amount of privacy protection as others. The REP analysis should ﬁll any practical gaps in
obscurity created by invasive technologies, recognizing that everyone should
be entitled to reasonably expect the same amount of privacy by obscurity, even
if in practice those experiences differ.
Finally, by considering the relationship between the parties as a factor in the
Jarvis (2019) REP analysis, the SCC implicitly acknowledged that trust can
serve as an important mechanism for expecting privacy when sharing information or space with others (Hartzog, 2018; Richards & Hartzog, 2017;
Waldman, 2018). This relationship factor allows for a consideration of what a
claimant should reasonably be able to expect, for instance, in what should be a
trusting relationship between students and a teacher. Recognizing the importance of trust in this relationship helps to mitigate the vulnerability and power
imbalance that can arise when sharing information or space in the context of
such a relationship (Waldman, 2018). However, similar to obscurity, the Court
could have taken this analysis a step further and recognized the ways in which
trust, as a mechanism for subjectively experiencing privacy, is inequitably
distributed in society. Due to the gendered nature of the common misuses of
invasive technologies, such as Jarvis’s use of a hidden camera, and systemic
gendered norms, such as the societal hypersexualization of teen girls’ bodies,
women and girls may have legitimate reasons to be less trusting in certain circumstances, even in what should be relationships of trust (Powell & Henry,
2017). The court in its REP analysis should be prepared to supplement the
interpersonal trust that individuals are able to rely upon in their lived experiences, even where claimants lose out due to their social location. In fact, one of
the students ﬁlmed by Jarvis has since reported that she now lives in fear of
people she thinks may be taking photos of her (Dodge, 2020). Her day-to-day
expectation of privacy through trust has been undermined as a result of her
experience. The courts must nevertheless assure that her equal access to legal
protection of her privacy, including through trust, remains intact.
The Court’s reasoning in Jarvis (2019) lays important precedential groundwork to justify further nuancing of REP analyses, both under the voyeurism
offense and hopefully in other areas of the law as well. We argue that equality
should be explicitly incorporated as a guiding factor in the REP analysis in order
to prompt courts to consider the systemic conditions that impact claimants’
expectations and experiences of privacy.
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Conclusion
The technologies of exposure and control highlighted in this chapter reveal some
of the equality issues that arise when considering a person’s REP. With gendered
privacy violations on the rise, it is time for the courts to consider equality in their
REP analysis. While the SCC decision in Jarvis (2019) took positive steps toward
a REP analysis that addresses privacy issues in an era of modern technology, it
did not go far enough. Gendered privacy invasions have shaped the introduction
of privacy laws in Canada, including laws prohibiting the nonconsensual distribution of intimate images and voyeurism, but the equality factor has yet to be
adequately addressed by legislators and the courts. For privacy laws to be
effective at addressing the realities of deepfakes, creepshots, drones, and stalkerware, the courts must explicitly examine the ways these technologies impact
equality-seeking groups.
In this chapter, we highlighted how women and other equality-seeking groups
may not share equal beneﬁts from obscurity and have legitimate trust concerns
that impact their privacy experiences due to their social location. Courts need to
recognize this reality. Including equality in the REP analysis would not only
provide a more fulsome understanding of the privacy questions before the courts,
but decisions that address equality would assist in denouncing privacy norms that
rely on discriminatory standards to minimize the severity of certain types of
invasions. Excluding equality from the REP analysis minimizes the lived experiences of members of equality-seeking groups and misses a key contextual factor
in the REP analysis. For our laws to truly address privacy breaches in modern
society, equality must be a factor.

Notes
1. Doxing is the unwanted publication of private or identifying information, such as a
person’s name, address, and contact information.
2. For an understanding of contextual integrity in relation to privacy, see Nissenbaum
(2010).
3. Madison Woodburn, one of the complainants in this case, fought to lift a publication ban that prevented her from speaking ﬁrsthand about her experiences
throughout the criminal investigation and court proceedings (Dodge, 2020).
4. It is worth noting that the SCC used female-gendered pronouns when referring to
the neutral singular person throughout the decision, and its hypotheticals exclusively featured women or girls as the victims, suggesting that the Court may have
been alert to the gendered impacts of the voyeurism offense.
5. No details were provided about other social identity factors about the claimants
and we recognize there may have been other equality issues at stake here that could
have been addressed.
6. The privacy rights and interests of Indigenous women in Canada have too long
been overlooked in Canadian colonial state policies. For example, pregnant
Indigenous women are statistically more likely to have their births reported to
social services through a “birth alert” system that ﬂags their ﬁles to social services,
increasing the chances that their child will be taken into state care at birth.
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Additionally, Canadian criminal and privacy law fail to account for the dignitary
interests and privacy expectations of transgender individuals in the ways they do cis
individuals. Transgender people who want to choose when to disclose their status
as a transgender person may be forced to disclose due to heteronormative and
transphobic concerns of gender fraud. Further, privacy law has been permissive of
intense public space scrutiny of individuals who claim insurance beneﬁts for
workplace injuries and long-term disabilities. These are just some examples of the
ways a person’s social location and status in an equality-seeking group will affect
the privacy norms surrounding them and what sort of intrusions the courts
determine they should expect.
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